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Bruce A. Rosenberg
In challenging a remark I had once made while presenting a 
paper at a professional meeting, a member of the audience said that he 
could demonstrate that there was no oral tradition in sixteenth-century 
Spain. To me this meant that the speaker had proof that people living on 
the Iberian Peninsula at that time never spoke to one another. Obviously, 
to him, “oral tradition” meant something else entirely. The very concept, 
the comprehension of such a mode of life, is alien to literates; and despite 
the writing done on the subject in recent decades by Walter Ong, Albert 
Lord, Ruth Finnegan, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and Jack Goody (to name 
only a few), “Oral Tradition” is not a concept widely understood by 
professional educators, let alone agreed upon. This essay will outline 
some of the major research and thinking done on this subject to date, 
to provide a context for uni-disciplinary work now done. It will not 
announce a truth; it will describe what the author has in mind when 
speaking of this mode.
Although many Romantics were, for their own reasons, enthralled 
with the idea of savage nobility and its lifeworld, a world in which the 
complicating (and corrupting) products of technology had not yet been 
imposed, that simple (oral) society has not been easy to identify. In his 
The Singer of Tales (1960:137), Albert Lord laments the rise of literacy 
in the Yugoslavia where he and Milman Parry did so much of their 
fi eldwork with the remark that printing had introduced the notion of the 
“fi xed” text and that there were now very few singers “who have not 
been infected by this disease.” Their performances are reproductions 
rather than creations, Lord continues, and “this means death to oral 
tradition . . .” (ibid.). Anthropologists and folklorists would not agree, 
since much of their research on the subject indicates that rarely is a
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society entirely oral (non-literate or pre-literate) or literate. The truth, as 
is usually the case with truth, is mixed.
Ruth Finnegan reminds us that some degree of literacy has been 
a feature of culture nearly all over the world for thousands of years 
(1977:23). In searching for a model culture in which to demonstrate the 
consequences of literacy, Jack Goody and Ian Watt (Goody 1968:27-
68) had to reject nearly every society of their acquaintance, certainly 
those of the “Third World,” before deciding on classical Greece. They 
found that initially they had to “reject any dichotomy based upon the 
assumption of radical differences between the mental attributes of 
literate and non-literate peoples” (44). Finnegan’s basic point, and mine, 
is that oral and literate societies exist in a continuity, not a dichotomy, as 
do their lyrics and narratives. The two kinds of society, if one can even 
speak of “kinds,” are not purely separate:
They shade into each other both in the present and over many centuries 
of historical development, and there are innumerable cases of poetry 
which has both “oral” and “written” elements. The idea of pure and 
uncontaminated “oral culture” as the primary reference point for the 
discussion of oral poetry is a myth (Finnegan 1977:24).
She sagely warns that nearly all of the (oral) Third World 
cultures have been exposed, in varying degrees, to the infl uence of 
literacy (1977:23); the line between oral and written literature, if there 
ever was one, is now hopelessly blurred. Linguists, measuring the 
amount of detail, direct quotation, sound and word repetition, syntactic 
parallelism, and so forth, conclude that written imaginative literature 
uses aspects of spoken language (e.g., Tannen 1982:18) and may be 
qualitatively indistinguishable. Finnegan was writing to argue with the 
Parry-Lord enthusiasts, but the point must not be disregarded out of 
that context. Purely oral folk probably cannot be identifi ed and studied 
today, but certain conclusions about orality are nevertheless possible, 
and some descriptions of oral literature can be made.
Philosophers such as Father Ong have tried to re-create what the 
world of the non-literate must be like and though his work is somewhat 
speculative, his insights are extremely valuable. Our diffi culty is 
suggested, for instance, by the necessity of using the locution “oral 
literature.” “Literature” means that which is
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written; the addition of “oral” makes the compound an oxymoron. 
The whole matter of orality is intricate anyway—do we mean orally 
composed, orally transmitted, or orally performed?—and “oral 
literature” denies the priority of orality as a communication mode. Just as 
the early typewriters were “writing machines” and the fi rst automobiles 
were “horseless carriages,” we have created the back-formation, “oral 
literature.” The difference between “horseless carriages” and “oral 
literature” is that the horse did “come” fi rst, while writing did not 
precede oral communication. The term “illiterate,” only slightly more so 
than “pre-literate,” gives a primacy and a normality to “literate”; to be 
illiterate is to lack something. Literacy has become so much the norm that 
we no longer think of “oral tradition” as redundant, though “tradition” 
originally meant transmission by word of mouth or by custom. Instead of 
the paradox “oral literature,” I have coined “Oralature,” employing both 
“oral” and a suffi x implying language which is ordered for an aesthetic 
purpose. This neologism, for whatever reason, has not taken hold.
Goody and Watt note that even in the most literate cultures “the 
transmission of values and attitudes in face-to-face contact” (1968:58-
59) is oral. They fi nd this desirable in some instances, citing the 
conservative infl uence of primary groups whose oral communication 
is more realistic in its attitudes than are commercial media, particularly 
television. It has long been appreciated that in literate cultures the most 
important aspects of life are communicated orally.
Melville Jacobs (1971:212) tells us that in the societies he 
analyzed everyone participated in the tribe’s “literary” heritage, unlike 
the situation in ours. Myths retold within the community contained many 
apostrophic pontifi cations which established the truth and strength of the 
community’s convictions. The goals of some folklorists in their study 
of oralatures is not distantly removed from the aims of some literary 
critics; oralature is the expression of a people—to some extent this is 
also true of the written art which is familiar to us—and not that of a few 
genuises (121).
All of the verbal elements in culture—literate and non-literate, 
but especially the latter—are transmitted by a long chain of interlocking 
face-to-face conversations between members of the group. All beliefs 
and values are related orally, face-to-face, and are held in human 
memory. Writing, and other components
76 BRUCE A. ROSENBERG
of a material tradition, are ideal for preserving data, but do not lend 
themselves so cogently to the assertion of a culture’s values. Oral 
traditions are both more specifi c and less ambiguous communication, 
because the speaker reinforces his or her specifi city of meaning with 
gesture, expression, intonation, and so on, and various self-correcting 
mechanisms of which fi xed print is incapable. Conrad’s narrator in 
Under Western Eyes comments that “words, as is well-known, are the 
great foes of reality” (1963:1). Nevertheless we can speak of print’s 
stability; the fi xity of print does give the relative stability of meaning to 
words (or tries to), while oral folk ratify the meaning of each word “in 
a succession of concrete situations” (Goody 1968:29). The vocabulary 
of non-literates is small, commonly around fi ve thousand words, 
as opposed to about seven or eight times that for a college-educated 
Western European or American; but in oral society there is much less 
disagreement about denotation and connotative usages. Words acquire 
and retain their meanings from their existential setting (Ong 1982:47).
While literature has made many aspects of culture available 
to a very great proportion of society’s members, the impersonality of 
print has also made culture easy to avoid. Print removes a portion of 
learning from that immediate chain of personal confrontations. In an 
oral culture the aged are the repositories of a culture’s wisdom; the 
elderly can be discounted somewhat in modern technological society, 
not so much because of rapid changes in successive waves of the 
“future,” but because wisdom is available in books. Plato had argued 
that the wisdom of writing was superfi cial; no give and take of cross-
examination and responses was possible. If the reader questions a 
written proposition, there can be no response, no defense. A book can be 
put aside; it may never be opened at all. Discussion, argument, and oral 
deliberation are not easily side-stepped in face-to-face situations. Some 
Indian philosophers (see Goody 1968:12-13) were suspicious of book 
knowledge (it is not operative and fruitful), and knowledge that was 
not acquired from teachers was suspect. Be that as it may, the impact of 
writing (and later, print) has been incalculable. It universalized the Italian 
Renaissance, helped to implement the Reformation, made capitalism 
possible (Eisenstein 1979). Print established the grammarian’s canon of 
correctness.
Objectifying words in print, and especially in dictionaries, makes 
them and their meanings vulnerable to intensive and
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prolonged scrutiny. They—words—are impossible to fi x. Durrell 
(1961:65) has complained about “as unstable” a medium as words. 
But this is no more than Chaucer had done; language changes in time, 
across distance, shifting as does mood. Dictionaries eventually become 
obsolete, yet during the era of their viability individual thought is fostered 
by them. The solitary, introspective reader is the polar opposite of the 
gregarious participant in an oral culture; yet both are, in these extreme 
images, heuristically symbolic. Nevertheless there is much measurable 
truth in this polar abstraction; the conservatism inherent in oral cultures 
militates against the individuation that writing and private reading foster. 
The ties in traditional societies tend to be between persons; in literate 
cultures the ties are complicated by abstract notions of rules, “by a more 
complicated set of complementary relationships between individuals in 
a variety of roles” (Goody and Watt 1968:62).
While contrasting these polarities, it is well to remember, once 
again, that we can only deal (safely) with tendencies, shades, and 
degrees, since an entirely oral culture, unaffected by writing or the 
infl uence of literacy, is a rare phenomenon. When sociolinguist Deborah 
Tannen summarizes the results of research comparing the relation of 
events, as narratives, by ethnic group (cited in Shiffrin 1981:960-61), 
it is not the same thing as comparing literate with non-literate groups. 
Greeks used verbal strategies associated with oral traditions, while 
Americans invoked those of literate traditions. But the claim could 
never be made that Greece is a pre-literate culture, or that even in its 
most remote fastnesses its citizens are untouched by print. Nevertheless, 
we want to be able to describe, however speculatively and uncertainly, 
the nature of an oral tradition, diffi cult as that is. Finnegan (1977:259) 
wrote a paragraph refuting some of the excesses of Marshall McLuhan’s 
overgeneralizations about orality, commenting that “a full refutation 
would inevitably fi ll a book.” She chose to cite McLuhan’s claims 
of the relative passivity and democratic ethos of oral cultures, noting 
the “aristocratic and aggressive ethos of the Zulu king Shaka” and the 
intensely meditative poetry of the Eskimos.
One of the innately appropriate uses of literacy is the compilation 
and preservation of data sets: lists, modern economic systems, capitalist 
or socialist, could not exist without literacy. Complicated accounting 
procedures (and ones not so complicated at that) and the storage of 
resultant data demand writing. So do
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records, fi les, bookkeeping, diaries, and the calculations stimulated by 
these procedures. Worker’s wage and tax records are stored by the hour, 
day, week, or year; chronology, as typifi ed by our dependence on the 
calendar, precise dating, and precise sequences must all have writing, 
if not print. So too with histories and other records of the past, in fact 
the very notion of the past as a series of datable events that happened 
then—all depend on writing. Ong argues that writing was invented in 
order to make lists (1982:99):
Indeed, writing was in a sense invented largely to make something 
like lists: by far most of the earliest writing we know, that in the 
cuneiform script of the Sumerians beginning around 1500 BC, is 
accountkeeping. Primary oral cultures commonly situate their 
equivalent of lists in narrative, as in the catalogue of the ships and 
captains in the Iliad (ii. 461-879)—not an objective tally but an 
operational display in a story about a war. In the text of the Torah, 
which set down in writing thought forms still basically oral, the 
equivalent of geography (establishing the relationship of one place 
to another) is put into a formulary action narrative (Numbers 33:16 
ff.): “Setting out from the desert of Sinai, they camped at Kibroth-
hattaavah. Setting out from Hazeroth, they camped at Rithmah. . .”, 
and so on for many more verses. Even genealogies out of such 
orally framed tradition are in effect commonly narrative. Instead of 
recitation of names, we fi nd a sequence of “begats,” of statements 
of what someone did.
Such sets occur in oral narrative for several reasons. The narrator in oral 
traditions is inclined to use the mnemonically useful formula, does not 
mind redundancy, is inclined to exploit balance (the repetition of the 
simple subject-predicate-object aids recall). The narrative context is far 
more vivid than a mere list; as Ong neatly puts it, “the persons are not 
immobilized as in a police line-up, but are doing something—namely 
begetting” (99).
Not to dispute those pious scholars and laymen who believe that 
Scripture is literally true in a sense that would be comprehensible to a 
literate historian, but oral traditions are rarely accurate with the precision 
of those who keep written records. This is one of its strengths. Useless 
data are forgotten in an oral tradition, while remembered phenomena are 
updated—made
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consistent with current beliefs and attitudes. Jack Goody tells the 
story (1968:33) of Gonja myths (of northern Ghana) at the beginning 
of this century which explained the seven political subdivisions in 
terms of the founder and his seven sons, each of whom succeeded to 
the paramountcy in turn following the father’s death. Fifty years later 
two of these subdivisions had been absorbed, for one reason or another, 
and British anthropologists collecting in the area found that the myths 
now described the founder and his fi ve sons. The geneologies were 
altered to fi t the facts of political reality during a half-century of serial 
remembering of etiological legends. And, Goody concludes, a similar 
process will transmute other elements of culture, even sacred lore, such 
as myths.
Literate societies do not and cannot alter their past as can an oral 
culture, or at least not in the same way:
Instead, their members are faced with permanently recorded versions 
of the past and its beliefs; and because the past is thus set apart 
from the present, historical enquiry becomes possible. This in turn 
encourages scepticism; and scepticism, not only about the legendary 
past, but about received ideas about the universe as a whole (Goody 
1968:67-68).
Hence the literate’s suspiciousness, that is, the academic’s suspiciousness, 
of orality and oral tradition. Oral literature is respectable (with a very 
few exceptions) only if it has come down to us in manuscript form.
Research in this area, it will come as no surprise, has been hard 
to come by. Anthropologists with linguistic expertise are available, but 
the purely oral society is not. Much of the work of American linguists 
on orality has thus been necessarily on speech among Americans, none 
of whom have been non- or pre-literates. It is not the same thing; but it is 
the only research that has been done. Deborah Tannen summarized much 
of the work conducted to date in a recent article in Language; some of 
her observations are nonetheless pertinent here, since the similarities 
between written and oral discourse (of literature) are demonstrated 
(1982:2-16).
She found that literary discourse is not substantially different 
from “ordinary conversation,” but is actually quite similar to it. Using 
features traditionally felt to be literary—sound patterning, word 
repetition, and so forth—she coincidentally argued against
80 BRUCE A. ROSENBERG
those who still believe that oral qualities are detectable when such 
a performance is fi xed in textual form. The speakers interviewed by 
Labov (1972) in his now seminal research used both oral and literate 
strategies in spoken discourse; one might well argue that rather than 
being “natural,” Labov’s informants were probably infl uenced in their 
narrative constructions by the conventions of our literary heritage. The 
infl uence of literacy is impossible to escape in our society; in primary 
classrooms the discourse of children was analyzed and found to be a 
preparation for literacy.
Recent sociolinguistic research confi rms that storytelling in 
conversation is based on “audience participation in inferred meaning” 
(Tannen 1982:4); among Clackamas tales, episodic transitions are 
sparse—sometimes just a morpheme—the audience fi lling in the 
details (Jacobs 1971:213). The effect of conversation, and narrative 
in conversation, involves and moves the auditor(s). Labov found 
that ordinary conversation shows a much more complex structure 
than oral narratives. In research that compared oral narratives with 
written versions by the same informant, the oral renderings were more 
expressive, the written stories more content-focused. Writing compacts 
narrative, integrating its verbal units more tightly. Yet when informants 
were asked to write imaginative prose—a “short story”—the result 
was lengthier; written imaginative literature combines the facility of 
involvement of spoken language with the integrative quality of writing. 
Lakoff has shown that many features of ordinary conversation are also 
in popular contemporary writing (cited in Tannen 1982:4). Parallelism 
and intonations thought to be basic in poetry are also basic in face-
to-face conversation. And further assimilating the two styles—if there 
are two—is the fi nding of researchers that informants’ written versions 
of stories used alliteration and assonance, traits associated with orality. 
Yet, for our purposes—a description of an oral tradition in a non-literate 
society—the above conclusions are at best tangential, useful mainly 
in discussion of orally derived text-literature. They show how speech 
affects our writing and vice versa; and that is not the same as the situation 
in a traditional society.
Oral tradition is the transmission of cultural items from 
one member to another, or others. Those items are heard, stored in 
memory, and, when appropriate, recalled at the moment of subsequent 
transmission. Several disciplines—anthropology and folklore, but 
sociolinguistics and psycholinguistics as well can shed
 THE COMPLEXITY OF ORAL TRADITION 81
light on such a situation—attempt to describe a world, one which 
participants of a literate world can barely begin to imagine. In an 
off-handed line, Levi-Strauss comments that “ethnology is fi rst of all 
psychology” (1966:131).
Memory, to repeat, is a vital human process in transmission. 
Psychologists break this down to four functioning categories: verbatim, 
gist, episodic, and general memory. Verbatim memory is the least 
frequently used in the lifeworld, certainly in oral traditions, though 
it is not unheard of. Passages are remembered by piecing together 
retrievable data, and then by giving them coherence by fi lling them out 
with supplementary information; it has been shown that people listen 
for meaning unless otherwise motivated, and not for verbatim wording 
(Clark and Clark 1977:134). We all assume that Albert Friedman was 
right when he wrote that memorization is the basic vehicle of oral 
tradition (cited in Finnegan 1971:53), but that memory is not a simple 
phenomenon. It is not a reduplicative process, for instance, but a 
procedure of creative reconstruction.
Memory for prose—written, alas, in Clark and Clark’s cited 
experiment, and not transmitted orally—depends primarily on four 
factors: the type and style of the language to be passed on; the situation 
of the listener at input; the interval of retention; and the circumstances 
and purposes of the output. Once again, though these conclusions about 
the infl uence on oral transmission were deduced from experiments 
with literate subjects, they seem to be largely true of transmission in 
general.
Controlled experiments have demonstrated the ability of 
long-term memory to store verbatim forms alone. Herbert and Eve 
Clark (1971:136) refer to those Hausa-speaking Nigerians who have 
memorized the Koran and who do not know any classical Arabic. The 
ability is not at all rare. Somali poets commonly memorize their poems, 
even those that take several evenings for a complete recital (Finnegan 
1977:74). She also reports that memorization was centrally involved in 
the recitation of Cambian epics of Sinjata, and that Ruandan and South 
African praise poems are usually memorized. When Finnegan leaves 
Africa, where she has done so much fi eldwork, she is on slightly less fi rm 
turf; the 40,000-line Rgveda is cited, composed more than a millennium 
before the birth of Christ, and said to have been transmitted verbatim 
(1977:122, 135). But this judgment has recently been questioned, since 
it is thought that the transmitters of the Rgveda
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may have occasionally consulted manuscripts for accuracy. Such a 
theory would bear out the report of Clark and Clark that memory for 
verbatim wording is rapidly lost, and over the long haul what is retained 
is the meaning.
But, although illiterates do try for verbatim repetition (Ong 
1982:62), they seldom achieve it, except in short genres, and in the 
rare cases cited above. Jacobs reported that his informants probably 
transmitted their older myths with “something close” to phrase and 
sentence memorization, in “some if not all episodes” (1971:268). But 
his diachronic experience with the Clackamas was limited, and he really 
could not be sure.
Parry had defi ned the formula as “a group of words which is 
regularly employed under the same metrical conditions to express a 
given essential idea” (1930:80). For many of his disciples the phrase 
“regularly employed” came to mean “repeatedly employed.” For Lord, 
Magoun, Duggan, and others, formulicity became an indisputable sign 
of oral composition. And we all now concede that the most marked trait 
of oralature is repetition—of some sort. Yet there is no universality of 
opinion about those aspects of the formula that must be repeated in 
order to “qualify”; metrical, syntactical, and semantic elements have 
all been considered, but vary in varying oralatures. Even the length of a 
putative formula is questioned: linguist H. L. Rogers (1966) questioned 
the failure of literary scholars to defi ne with satisfactory precision any 
of the components of Parry’s formula. Joseph Russo (1976) argues that a 
fuller and more rigorously analyzed sample of Homeric verse might not 
support the claims for a higher formulaic content in the epics, and that 
the overall level of formulicity might prove to be little higher than that 
assumed for literary texts. Further research has not borne out Russo’s 
suspicions, and despite all the modifi cations and reservations expressed 
about the oral-formulaic theory, Milman Parry did make us aware of 
that characteristic of oral narrative, the repetitive formula, however and 
in whatever way repetitive. Repetition may not be the “touchstone” of 
oral poetry (Finnegan 1977:130), but it occurs so often that Ong can 
meaningfully speak of “the oral drive to use formulas” (1982:99).
Formulas, of whatever sort, are memory aids almost entirely. 
Too much has been made of the audience’s liking for familiar language 
because of its comforting aspects; it is more likely that aural participants 
in oralature performances like formulas and familiarity of plot because 
they can participate more than passively,
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not as active performers, but neither merely receptively like modern 
hushed audiences at a poetry reading. Experiments have shown that 
listeners fi lter out what they consider to be errors (many traditional 
audiences will correct errors as they occur, aloud); the auditor stores 
in memory only what is thought to be correct, or what is thought was 
intended. Passages are relatively easy to memorize if they are meaningful, 
and in the listener’s native language. Grammaticality is also important, 
as is brevity; rhyme is an aid to memorization, as is metricality (Clark 
and Clark 1971:138-41).
In memory people store kernel sentences and the necessary 
notation that will account for a transformation when the sentences 
are recalled; the process of output “makes note” of the necessary 
transformations and appropriately transforms the stored kernel sentence. 
American speakers, at least—those from whom these results were 
observed—are biased toward active sentences in memory, and to subject 
priority. There seems to be also a preference for an “order-of-mention-
contract,” supporting Labov’s thesis that recalled personal experiences 
are related with a chronology that matches that of the actual events. The 
comparative is easier to remember (over the equative), as are positive 
statements over negative ones.
Inferences are stored, and when recalled, often mistaken for 
their inferences in the original sentence. A major source of confusion is 
people’s inclination to integrate new information with that of their world 
knowledge before storing; at recall it is often diffi cult to remember which 
pieces of information were acquired when. All known facts regarding a 
single entity are clustered around a “single point,” and that organization 
controls recall (Clark and Clark 1971:156-60). Thus, Jacobs (1971:249 
ff.) found that his Clackamas stories and myths did not explain nature, 
people, or customs; explicitness was unnecessary because certain 
memory cues in the narrative would evoke the relevant message. In such 
a traditional society, just the titles of stories were suffi cient to explain 
the plot to the audience. Everyone participated in the tribe’s literary 
heritage, so that the meaning of each narrative was effectively conveyed 
to all members briefl y and without the sense of moralizing.
Information at the instant of input is made consonant with the 
listener’s “global representation” of reality; and, as noted, in a traditional 
society that global representation will more closely
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represent group values and attitudes than in a literate one. Recall will 
refl ect this construction, even if it is inaccurate or wrong. Memory is 
reconstructive in any case. But the individual’s global representations, 
made at the moment of input, have already shaped the information 
according to his or her background and experience, so that the recalled 
product may be relatively divorced from the original source of 
information (Clark and Clark 1971:164). The same phenomenon occurs 
during the communicative process of stories. Listeners build global 
representations of elements of the heard narratives, with the results 
(sharpening, leveling, rationalization) described by Bartlett (1932).
The Finns codifi ed the kinds of “mistakes” (“variations” is 
more objective and is actually much closer to the evaluative truth of the 
situation) which they found in their fi eld experience. In songs, single 
verses or groups of them are displaced, while some segments are dropped 
altogether. Forgetting was increasingly frequent when the performer 
was outside his or her community or family, another evidence of the 
stabilizing role of an informed traditional audience. Details superfl uous 
to “the main theme” are the fi rst to disappear from a narrative. Specifi c 
traits may be generalized and specifi ed, the result of partial recall loss; 
or details may be repeated or expanded (Krohn 1971:66, 56-72).
All of these processes conspire to alter the details in the 
transmission of narratives (as of ordinary facts), to get it “wrong.” 
Stories in our culture are goal-oriented (Clark and Clark 1971:170), and 
even though many of the details are altered in transmission, the goals of 
the narrative tend to be preserved. That leaves a great deal of room for 
variation; and it is another demonstration of the fragility of interpreting 
traditional narratives from the text alone. Stories may be shortened by 
reducing causative agents, initiators, and enabling events, with no loss 
of meaning to an experienced audience, as Jacobs found. Yet such a 
truncated story would seem to bear little relation to an analogue distended 
with detail, compared on the basis of transcriptions alone.
Rumelhart (1977) found that the listeners he observed structured 
their own hierarchies of heard stories, and their recall was determined 
by this structure. Those aspects so ordered were setting, event, action, 
change of state, the internal and overt responses of characters, and so 
on. Listeners arranged these components when they formed, at input, 
their own global representations of the story. In recall, this hierarchy 
was
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reconstructed. The classic psycholinguistic study of the effect of 
memory on storytelling is Bartlett’s, often cited by folklorists but always 
with qualifi cations. And rightly so; Bartlett’s subjects were Cambridge 
University students, not the homogeneous group one fi nds in a traditional 
society. The narratives were transmitted to each student in writing, not 
orally. And the narratives used in these experiments were not native to the 
students, but, as nearly all have remarked, somewhat strange and exotic. 
Consequently, the Cambridge students made many more alterations in 
transmitting these tales than would be true of the native transmission of 
familiar material. For instance, Bartlett noted the tendency to rationalize 
certain magical or otherwise supernatural elements; but this is just what 
we would expect from students at Cambridge University who were 
relating an unfamiliar story fi lled with magical elements in which they 
did not believe.
In recent years reader-oriented criticism has stressed the role of 
the receiver in the aesthetic transaction. In oral tradition the listener 
is even more important in several respects, certainly important in 
understanding the oral tradition itself. Since Lord we have all become 
aware of the oral poet’s instant responses to his oral audience, and to 
his fl exibility in reacting to them. If the performance is not going well, 
the reciter usually has several techniques for livening audience interest 
(more dramatic gesture, more engaging expression, more eye contact); 
or he can abbreviate the performance, cutting his losses. The writer 
has no such audience awareness. In some societies the group involves 
itself quite actively, as in Hawaiian oral poetry where the composition 
is collaborative, insuring a precise transmission of traditional materials 
(Finnegan 1977:85-86). Melville Jacobs (1971:211) likens an oral 
performer to a Western actor, the performance to theater, not a brilliant 
or an original metaphor, but one that usefully describes the situation. 
It is a theater where the audience is free to correct the performer. The 
older Clackamas listeners made corrections of phrases and even specifi c 
words during the recital of myths. And at story recitals a full discussion 
of the plot (both during and after recitals) is usual; interruptions were by 
a theorizing and fantasizing audience (269). The same happens among 
the Somali, who feel free to correct “faulty” renderings of known poems 
(Finnegan 1977:74-75). In brief, much more so than with written poetry, 
an oral audience’s aesthetics refl ect the purpose and effect of the poem.
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One of the American folk preachers whose performances I 
recorded for my own research in a domestic oral tradition of formulaic 
composition (1970:103-4) was instantly able to correct errors he had 
just made in his own performance; the correction formulas of Rev. 
Rufus Hays appeared to be spontaneous, and not pre-formed such as 
the one Finnegan notes during the singing of Yoruba hunter’s songs. In 
the latter situation other expert singers may be present, and if they feel 
that a mistake has been made they will interrupt the singer with some 
such formula as, “You have told a lie, you are hawking loaves of lies. . . 
listen to the correct version now. . . . Your version is wrong. . . (Finnegan 
1977:232).
Edson Richmond once remarked to me that folklore was 
everything that didn’t get communicated when an oral performance is 
transcribed. The performance situation is vital; it throbs. Lord (1960) 
noted that when his guslari dictated their poems the meter—the meter of 
the rapid oral communication—broke down and that nearly all elements 
of the performance were affected. Jacobs noted the same among his 
informants (1971:221). Linguists have found that when subjects are 
asked to write out versions of stories they have been reciting orally, the 
written versions are different also: more compact and more integrated 
(Tannen 1982:8).
The best stories, oral as well as written (as many think), say 
the least while evoking the most.1 In oral traditions brief statements 
are often evocative of a substantial recall. Narratives that allow 
the audience a maximum of imaginative creativity are the most 
successful (Jacobs 1971:21). In this way the auditors participate in the 
performance in a creative way; they feel as though they are a creative 
part of the performance in active, participatory ways that the reader is 
not. Repetitive language enables an audience to anticipate not only the 
narrative elements to come, but the phrasing as well. Empowered to 
criticize, oral/aural audiences are genuinely part of the performance, 
creatively and not merely passively.
Axel Olrik’s famous “epic laws” of oralature are both well enough 
known not to need repeating here, but must at this point be cited, at 
least in outline.2 Olrik observed, to condense greatly, that oral narratives 
do not begin or end abruptly, but move from calm to excitement (and 
vice versa at their conclusion); threes, in repetitions, in the numbers of 
characters and events and in details, abound, and have for millennia in 
the West; only two characters
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appear in one scene at any time (if more, only two speak at one time); 
the oral narrative is polarized as to character types and plot genre3; 
twins violate this “law,” as though weakened, and are unable to occupy 
a major role in the action—when they do they are subject to the “law of 
contrast”; folk narrative is comprised of tableaux scenes, has a unity of 
plot, and concentrates on a leading character (as summarized in Dundes 
1965:131-41).
In a more general way, thinking in an oral culture takes place in 
mnemonic patterns, “shaped for ready oral occurrence” (Ong 1982:34). 
The oral style of discourse is more focused, slower-moving, frequently 
redundant. Oral poetry tends to be additive rather than being organized 
by subordination (ibid.:37-40). The characters in such narratives are 
noticeably “heavy” character types, rarely three-dimensional, and 
monumental4; their creators strive to make them memorable. Oral 
cultures do not organize long, climactic narratives; climactic plots are not 
natural, do not conform with events in the lifeworld (ibid.:70, 143). Yet 
oral narratives can be lengthy (narratives quite aside from the Odyssey 
and the Iliad, whose “oralness” needs several pages of qualifi cation and 
explanation); Stith Thompson singles out “vagabonds” as individuals 
who often “string out their stories to an inordinate length,” while some 
tellers elaborate their tales to an extraordinary degree while keeping 
“the old general pattern” (1977:451-52).
Keeping to the “general” pattern is the most exact mode that 
nearly all oral transmitters are capable of. Precision, as already noted, 
is a product of writing. An oral culture cannot deal in geometric fi gures, 
abstract categorization, or formal logic; and illiterates cannot organize 
“elaborate concatenations of causes” (Ong 1982:55-57). It is print that 
fosters tight and intricate plotting, such as we take for granted in the 
detective story and the spy novel. Goody and Watt similarly observe:
The same process of dissection into abstract categories, when applied 
not to a particular argument but to the ordering of all the elements 
of experience into separate areas of intellectual activity, leads to the 
Greek division of knowledge into autonomous cognitive disciplines 
which has since become universal in Western culture and which is 
of cardinal importance in differentiating literate and non-literate 
cultures (Goody 1968:54).
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Inaccuracy and reduced intellectual performance (of certain 
analytic processes) occasionally deplored by cerebral literates are 
certainly present. Yet much of the contempt felt by literates for the 
unlettered is not justifi ed. Lévi-Strauss has shown how some of the most 
important aspects of “the savage mind” (1966) are merely differently 
coded expressions of the same fundamental thoughts of sophisticated 
cultures; “savage mind” (la pensée sauvage) is in itself an ironic 
statement intended by the author, since savages are not, popularly, 
supposed to have sophisticated thought at all. Yet, not only do totemic 
societies evolve cerebrally intricate structures; they also refl ect on the 
nature of poetry (Finnegan 1977:236).
Economic development as well as literacy does not seem to 
infl uence the fl ourishing of poetry; among certain Polynesian societies 
praise poems are felt to belong to certain families, and at times a member’s 
claim to rank may depend upon his power to reproduce, “letter-perfect,” 
his family chants and his “name song.” Many oral poets are among their 
society’s elite. Among the Clackamas upper class, life is depicted in the 
poems of the oral tradition (Jacobs 1971:176).
Ong concludes Orality and Literacy with the remarks that while 
no one wants to advocate illiteracy, and while every oral culture in his 
knowledge wants to acquire the ability to read once it has been exposed to 
the possibility, oral cultures have produced “creations beyond the reach 
of literates, for example, the Odyssey” (175). The list should be extended; 
and it could be extended to include those written works which have also 
enjoyed an extensive oral currency: Marlowe’s “Come Live With Me 
and Be My Love” and Raleigh’s reply were printed anonymously on 
broadsheets, and were sung (as were many poems) by broadside street 
peddlers. The poems of Burns are still recited aloud today. Writing co-
exists peacefully with orality; it is not its executioner.
Brown University
Notes
1Although linguists define literate strategies as supplying maximal background 
information and “connective tissue” (e.g., Tannen 1982:3). 
2For a general account, see Dundes 1965:129-41.
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3Ong (1982:45) observes that oral culture is full of praise as well as vituperation, 
reflecting polarization.
4Ong (1982:152) insists that round characters are not possible. 
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